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I.

FIRST IMPRESSIONS

In the preface to Emergence of a Free Press, Leonard Levy tells
a wonderful story of the book's original appearance twenty-six years
ago, in i96o. 3 In 1957 the Fund for the Republic under Robert
Hutchins commissioned Levy to write a memorandum on the original
meaning of the first amendment's clauses. The twenty-five pages he
produced on the free speech and free press clauses turned out surprisingly, to Levy as well as to the Fund. The conclusions did not
vindicate the liberal optimism of the project's sponsors that these
clauses were a triumph of early libertarianism. Accordingly, Levy
reports, Hutchins "made it clear to me that the pamphlet [which the
Fund meant to publish] would not include that section of the work"
(p. viii).
The Fund's effective censorship of Levy's work was unseemly and
unwise. It misjudged the character of the man; it so angered Levy
as to drive him to an academic's revenge. From what might have
been a mere "but see" minor pamphlet citation against Zechariah
Chafee's famous Free Speech in the United States, Levy's memorandum eventually became a tremendously controversial counterweight
to Chafee's work. Enormously expanded and deepened in its research,
the unprepossessing memorandum became Legacy of Suppression:
Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History. Its principal
4
conclusion, pugnaciously explicit in its title, was devastating.
Leonard Levy schooled the Fund for the Republic in the poet's
claim that "Truth, crushed to earth, shall rise again." '5 Levy's fallen
I Andrew W. Mellon All Claremont Professor of Humanities, Claremont College.
2 Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University.
3 It then appeared as L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS
IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (i96o).

4 Chafee's principal conclusion was that the drafters and ratifiers of the first amendment
intended "to wipe out the common law of sedition, and make further prosecutions for criticism
of the government, without any incitement to law-breaking, forever impossible in the United
States of America." Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (1941). Levy's
principal conclusion was virtually the opposite. See L. LEvY, supra note 3, at 247-48.
5 William Cullen Bryant, The Battle-field (837), in THE POETICAL WORKS OF WILLIAM
CULLEN BRYANT ISI, 182 (916).
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bird, his original memorandum, had become a phoenix - a firebird
of skeptical scholarship reborn in the ashes of foundational censorship.
It was a deeply impressive work. Its principal thesis, delivered by a
reluctant but resolute scholar, was that the first amendment did not
6
renounce, but rather received, the full common law of seditious libel.
A quarter of a century has elapsed since Legacy of Suppression
first appeared. Its author thought it needed revision, and sixty percent
of Emergence of a Free Press is apparently new material (p. vii). In
the preface to Emergence, Levy explains that his earlier work may
have been somewhat overstated, partly from unconscious "indignation
at Hutchins and the Fund for attempting to suppress my work" (p.
ix). Further, Professor Levy makes clear that some of the material
provided by scholars who were disturbed by his earlier work has
contributed to some rethinking on his own part. 7 Emergence, then,
is Legacy revised - the mature scholar's more reflective ruminations
on the origins of the free speech and free press clauses.
How different is Emergence from Legacy? Not significantly in
terms of substantive conclusions, despite the welcome addition of new
material. 8 Nor does Professor Levy say otherwise. 9 Indeed, the single
most critical conclusion that made Legacy dramatic and controversial
in i96o is verbatim the same:
If .

.

. a choice must be made between two propositions, first, that

the [freedom of speech and press] clause substantially embodied the
6 Since the preparation of this book review, Professor Levy has published an article severely
criticizing another author for a similar description of Legacy. See Levy, The Legacy Reexamined,
37 STAN. L. REV. 767, 77o n.H (1985). I am concerned lest Professor Levy also think he has
been misconstrued here, despite efforts in the course of this review to supply the reader with
quotations and references. Given the circumstances, I think it of more than ordinary importance
to encourage the reader to read the work under review rather than to trust substitute descriptions.
7 Legacy provoked a large number of reviews, many of which Levy cites in his preface to
Emergence (p. xiv n.ii). For two of the most recent and critical reviews, see Anderson, The
Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455 (1983); Mayton, Seditious Libel and the
Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 91 (984). For Levy's response
to Anderson, see Levy, On the Origins of the Free Press Clause, 32 UCLA L. REv. 177 (1984).
For his response to Mayton, see Levy, supra note 6.
In addition to the reviews, a number of scholarly books exploring particular aspects of speech
and press history have appeared since Legacy, and Levy acknowledges these works in Emergence. Among the best of these books is E. HUDON, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN
AMERICA (1963). For a most helpful earlier work, see F. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN
ENGLAND 1476-1776 (952).
8 Although I had read Legacy three times, I read Emergence with little sense that it differed
from Legacy in anything but the elaborate footnotes responding to reviews and criticisms of the
original work. Only on going back over Emergence carefully could I see how sixty percent
might be new. The figure is doubtless accurate, and I have no interest in suggesting otherwise.
My point is that the main conclusions and general development are so similar to the original as
to encourage the illusion that Emergence is a nearly identical work.
9 "My principal thesis remains unchanged" (p. xii).
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Blackstonian definition and left the law of seditious libel in force, or
second, that it repudiated Blackstone and superseded the common
law, the evidence points strongly in support of the former proposition.
(P. 281).
On this central point, Levy has expanded the new edition principally
to restate the original material, to enlarge upon it, and to defend it
against its critics. The author has essentially not budged on the
principal question.
The primary change (which figures prominently in the retitling of
the book) is a factual concession, which has little effect on Levy's
main thesis. Levy acknowledges that, given his description of the
prevailing state of the law, the original work may have implied that
the early press in America was an intimidated and cowed collection
of ineffective newspapers. He is now at pains to correct that misimpression. Despite the received law of seditious libel, Levy notes, a
robust and vituperative press thrived. Further research into the early
history of newspapers in America confirmed that prosecutions of the
press, although not infrequent, scarcely affected the onrush of derogatory newsprint. Indeed, he acknowledges, a fractious American press
developed as an influential fourth estate much earlier than one might
have supposed - but it did so within the context of "a system characterized by legal fetters and the absence of a theory of political
expression that justified those press practices" (p. xvii). Early press
practices, Levy insists, thus had no immediate impact upon the substantive law. Rather, it is Levy's point that such practices left the
law substantially unaffected. Exactly as John Stuart Mill observed of
English law in 1858, the early American law remained servile to the
rationale of state interest and thus remained available to governmental
officials whenever the right occasion might demand.' 0
The second notable modification from the original edition concerns
the influence of the strict Blackstonian view of the free press on
American common law practice and the first amendment. Blackstone's belief, one will recall, was that "the freedom of the press"
consisted solely in exemption from licensing and some other forms of
prior restraint. This view offered the press no shelter from subsequent
criminal accountability for "mischievous" or "offensive" utterances or
10 In the first paragraph of the chapter entitled "Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion"
in On Liberty, Mill wrote:
Though the law of England, on the subject of the press, is as servile to this day as it
was in the time of the Tudors, there is little danger of its being actually put in force
against political discussion, except during some temporary panic, when fear of insurrection drives ministers and judges from their propriety; and, speaking generally, it is not,
in constitutional countries, to be apprehended, that the government, whether completely
responsible to the people or not. will often attempt to control the expression of opinion,
except when in doing so it makes itself the organ of the general intolerance of the public.
J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 17 (D. Spitz ed. 1975) (ist ed. London 1859) (footnotes omitted).
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for statements "of a pernicious tendency," distressing to "government
and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty."'" Under this
view, Parliament's decision of 1694 not to renew the infamous press
licensing regime against which John Milton had inveighed a halfcentury earlier 12 marked the sole, allegedly ample boundary of protection for a free press. Consistent with that position, four varieties
of criminal libel were fully punishable in the common law courts:
blasphemous, obscene, private, and seditious libel. In Emergence,
Levy retreats somewhat from the stringency of his previous judgment
that the framers adopted the Blackstonian view whole. Although he
continues to maintain that the framers assumed that seditious libel the most threatening of the common law forms - would survive the
first amendment, he now suggests that some of the worst common
law features of this kind of libel had already been partly discredited
(pp. ix-xi ).
At common law, prosecutions for seditious libel initially inhered
in virtually any act that might estrange the people from their government - including accusations of governmental wrongdoing or corruption. Most important, the truth of the statements critical of the government was no defense. Indeed, at one point the Star Chamber went
so far as to suggest that truth might be an aggravating factor of the
crime, because a true statement regarding governmental misconduct
might well pose more of a danger than an easily rebuttable false one.
Additionally, even after the inquisitorial Star Chamber was abolished
in 1642 and the common law courts took up an expanded jurisdictionover seditious libel prosecutions,1 3 the role of the jury in those courts
was extremely limited. For example, the presiding judge, and not the
jury, determined whether the words used by the defendant possessed
a seditious tendency and whether they were published with malice.14
The jury merely found whether the defendant was a publisher of the
words and whether the words expressed or implied such innuendo as
the prosecutor alleged would make them seditious as a matter of law.
With the role of the jury so slight, and that of the crown-favoring
judges so great, publishers were at enormous risk.
I 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *I51-52.
12See J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 58 (R. Jeeb ed. 1918) (Ist ed. London 1644) ("[Tlhough
all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do
injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength."). Milton's views are critically
reviewed in Emergence at pp. 93-97. Levy notes that Milton's essential thought had already
been put forward thirty years earlier by Leonard Busher, an obscure Baptist layman (p. io).
13 For a recent article suggesting that the demise of licensing led to expansive adaptations
of seditious libel in the English courts, see Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious

Libel and the Control of the Press, 37 STAN. L. REv. 661, 714-25 (1985).
14 The requirement of "malice," moreover, was in effect no requirement at all because judges
routinely inferred malice from the mere nature of the defendant's statements.
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In Emergence, however, Levy notes that by the time Congress
considered the Bill of Rights in 1789, both legal practice and legal
theory in the United States had undergone some degree of change.
Juries were permitted a larger role and, indeed, jury nullification
practices sometimes saved publishers who doubtless would have been
convicted in a bench trial. Some jurisdictions also acknowledged the
defense of truth. Accordingly, Levy notes that the freedom of speech
and of the press defined by the first amendment may have absorbed
these new limitations upon the law of seditious libel.1 5 Indeed, the
major congressional action bearing on freedom of the press in the
early years of the republic, the Sedition Act of 1798, was quite in
accord with these developments.16
But in this slightly softened form - that is, softened from the
original position in Legacy - Levy still concludes that the first amendment was adopted to co-exist with the common law legacy of seditious
libel and did not represent its repudiation. Thus, although much more
elaborate than Legacy, Emergence fundamentally reaffirms that work's
skeptical first amendment thesis. At least it appears to do so when
17
judged by the author's own expressed assessment of the times.
Yet it is not clear to me that the whole of the book really supports
this thesis. Some of the parts of Emergence are not altogether well
accounted for in what we have thus far reviewed. Indeed, the sum
of the work's parts is in many ways extremely different; it frankly
does not support the existence of a wide-ranging power in Congress
to regulate speech and the press. To the contrary, it suggests a
decision on the part of the framers that Congress would have nothing
to say in determining the latitude of speech or press in the United
States. Thus, in significant respects Emergence provides a thesis set
against itself - a thesis at odds with a weak view of the first amendment. To see how this may be so, we need to begin again.

ISLevy terms these limitations "Zengerian principles" (p. 219), a nice turn of phrase that
pays tribute to the impact of the jury's decision to acquit Peter Zenger in 1735, despite apparently
incontrovertible evidence and a straightforward instruction from the judge concerning the applicable law of seditious libel. The case is well presented at pp. 37-44.
It should be noted, however, that Professor Levy retains some doubts about whether the
first amendment incorporated these changes in the common law of seditious libel (pp. 274-77).
The reason for his uncertainty lies in the words of the first amendment; the amendment applies
to "Congress." but not necessarily to judge-made federal common law.
16Levy suggests that the Sedition Act "incorporated everything that the libertarians had
demanded: a requirement that criminal intent be shown; the power of the jury to decide whether
the accused's statement was libelous as a matter of law as well as of fact; and truth as a defense,
an innovation not accepted in England until 1843" (p. 297).
17"The thought and experience of a lifetime, indeed the taught traditions of law and politics
extending back many generations, supplied an a priori belief that freedom of political discourse,
however broadly conceived, stopped short of seditious libel" (p. 269).
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SECOND IMPRESSIONS

Laying Leonard Levy's book aside for a moment, I suppose it is
true that, roughly speaking, there are two broad categories of theses
about the relationship between the law of seditious libel and the
framing of the first amendment. Within the first category are claims
that the two subjects are directly connected - that the law of seditious
libel figured prominently in the framing of the first amendment and
that one of the amendment's principal objects was to settle whether
seditious libel could be used as an instrument of national power.
Within the second category, no such resolving claim is made. Rather,
the claim is that the two subjects are only indirectly related, although
related nonetheless. Under the latter supposition, the framers of the
first amendment were not principally concerned with seditious libel,
yet their determinations as set forth in the amendment have certain
logical consequences with respect to a large number of subjects, including (but not limited to) seditious libel.
Based on first impressions, Leonard Levy's book might seem to
support a thesis that would fall in the first category. Indeed, that is
surely why Legacy initially provoked such a large number of deeply
critical reviews - reviews dismayed by the thought that the crabbed
Blackstonian view of a free press was congenial to the framers and
was therefore preserved among the powers of Congress in the framing
of the first amendment.
In the beginning of Emergence, Levy takes care to state that this
is not in fact his contention. He sets before himself a much more
limited task: the critical reexamination of the assertive affirmative
thesis that "in both law and history ... it was the intent of the
American Revolution or the Framers of the First Amendment to
abolish the common law of seditious libel" (p. xii). That thesis is, of
course, a "category one" kind of thesis - it asserts (or assumes) that
the subject of seditious libel figured prominently in the framing of the
first amendment and attempts to establish that the object of the
amendment was to repudiate the common law legacy. In Emergence,
Levy makes an extremely solid case that this thesis claims too much
that the "category one" libertarian claim is subject "to the Scottish
verdict: not proven" (p. 269).
In the course of discharging what was at first a very limited
burden, however, Levy seems to go far toward adopting the opposite
view - that the framers of the first amendment intended to concede
to Congress the power to enact legislation directed against the forms
of speech included within the common law definition of seditious libel.
At the end of Emergence, Levy - whose personal preference is for a
first amendment worthy of some distinction - makes a suggestion
that he thinks will save the amendment, but that itself implies the
amendment meant to favor Congress. "What [the framers] said," Levy
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writes, "is far more important than what they meant. It is enough
that they gave constitutional recognition to the principle of freedom
of speech and press in unqualified and undefined terms" (p. 349). This
advice is in fact very heavy, for it plainly asserts that there is a
disparity between what the framers meant and what they said. Here,
then, in the ultimate and penultimate sentences of his work, Levy
tends to confirm his critics' description of what Leonard Levy thinks
history really shows: that the relationship between seditious libel and
the first amendment is indeed a "category one" kind of relationship,
but that the framers of our first amendment meant to grant (rather
than to deny) Congress a broad power to enact repressive legislation.
Perhaps that negative thesis is correct, but taken as an original
thesis, with its own burden to carry, there is much reason to doubt
it.18 In fact, little evidence sustains it as an affirmative brief, and a
great deal supports the view that it is false. What is more, Professor
Levy himself furnishes much of the best evidence that it is false. It
is for this reason that his book is more complicated than it first appears
to be and, indeed, is a book that in some measure undermines its
own thesis.
Leaning strongly against any claim of substantial power in Congress over the press are, first of all, the disclaimers of leading Federalists. As Levy himself observes, even such noted Federalists as
James Wilson and Alexander Hamilton generally denied the very
possibility of national legislation regulating the press. The new na' There is good reason to be concerned with this question, because Professor Levy's suggestion for rescuing the first amendment from its history by relying upon what the framers said
(as distinct from what they meant) may not be sustainable.
Like a number of other modern writers, Levy presumes to describe the first amendment as
an amendment that grants constitutional recognition to "the principle" of free speech. Like some
other writers also, he says the framers "gave constitutional recognition to the principle of free
speech . . . in unqualified . . . terms" (p. 349) (emphasis added). Looking solely to what the
framers said (and laying aside all evidence of what they may have meant), the first amendment
provides no firm support for either of these suggestions. The first suggestion begs its own
question respecting what principle the framers recognized in the amendment. The second
suggestion must struggle against the text of the first amendment itself.
What the framers said is merely that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom
of speech or of the press." Who says these words "recognize" a "principle"? What principle is
it? The amendment does not speak to the issue at all. It is utterly uninstructive on that point.
The assertion may be correct or it may be incorrect; nothing on the face of the amendment
makes the one possibility more likely than the other. The appeal to "the principle" thus
"recognized" is entirely circular.
The second assertion - that the first amendment speaks in "unqualified" terms - is most
puzzling. Such freedom of speech and of the press as may be protected is not described by the
first amendment in unqualified terms; rather it is described in circumscribing terms. "[The"
freedom of speech (whatever that may be) is protected, nothing more. The locution of the first
amendment is thus not the locution of unqualified terms. Rather, the amendment seems to say
that a certain freedom of speech ("the" freedom) is protected and that in regard to all else,
Congress may do what it will.
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tional government, Wilson declared, would have "'no power whatsoever"' concerning the press (p. 270).19 And "'why declare that things
shall not be done,"' Hamilton wrote, "'which there is no power to
do?"' (p. 270).20 Indeed, Levy notes that "[o]nly after the new government had gone into operation and after the ratification of the First
Amendment did many of the Framers and their associates begin to
speak and act as if freedom of speech and press could be prosecuted
in federal courts and be abridged by Congress as well" (p. 274) (emphasis added). The material scarcely supports the view that the framers intended to give Congress wide-ranging power to adopt the kind
of legislation that the Sedition Act of 1798 represents.
As Levy notes, it was only the Sedition Act of 1798 that stimulated
self-serving Federalist claims of congressional power over the press.
He is surely correct in noting that the factional politics of the Act
make it an "unreliable" (p. 282) and "untrustworthy" (p. 279) source
of first amendment insight. And insofar as its debates do reveal
anything about the intention of the framers, it is noteworthy that
"[e]very Democratic-Republican with the possible exception of James
Sullivan believed it to be unconstitutional" (p. 28o). Included within
this substantial group of opponents was James Madison, the principal
author of the first amendment. In Levy's own opinion, Madison was
"the most influential of all the Framers" and was "possibly the one
person of outstanding distinction whose record [was] clean and consistent" (p. 281). What, then, was Madison's view? As Levy reports
it, Madison's view was that the first amendment flatly forbade the
enactment of~a national sedition act. Indeed, "[t]he amendment, Madison declared, was intended to have the broadest construction on
freedom of the press as well as religion. It 'meant a positive denial
to Congress of any power whatever on the subject"' (p. 318).
What does this material prove? Does it prove that in fact there
was a robust libertarian repugnance to everything even mildly akin
to seditious libel (and thus that the Chafee thesis may be correct after
all)? In context, the material does not prove this thesis because it
says nothing about the extent to which the several states might enact
or otherwise proceed in accordance with seditious libel law. The
evidence does indicate, however, a deep distrust of Congress and a
19 Wilson, Levy notes, attempted at other times to rely on an extraconstitutional body of

continuing federal criminal common law. As to that claim, however, Levy himself concludes
that "the evidence is contradictory" (p. 275), and the Supreme Court rejected the general notion
the first time it came up on review, see United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, II U.S. (7 Cranch)
32 (1812).
20 Further support can be found in James Madison's account of the constitutional convention.

On Friday, Sept. 14, I787, in convention, "Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Gerry, moved to insert a
declaration 'that the liberty of the Press should be inviolably observed.' Mr. Sherman. It is
unnecessary. The power of Congress does not extend to the Press." J. MADISON, NOTES OF
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 640 (A. Koch ed. i966).
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determination that the first amendment would prevent any significant
congressional regulation of speech and the press. The evidence tends
also to make credible the claim that the objections to the Sedition Act
of 1798 were not feigned or contrived, but genuine and profound.
None of this material, on the other hand, provides any support whatever for the view that there was an acknowledged design to carry
into the original Constitution, much less into the first amendment, a
significant congressional power over the press.
What in fact the evidence suggests most strongly is that the relationship between seditious libel and the first amendment was not a
"category one" kind of relationship at all. At the time of the debate
about the first amendment, the principal issue to be settled was quite
different. It was the federalism issue: not what speech was worth
protecting, but rather who, as between Congress and the state governments, would have definitive power over that subject. It is because
of the way in which that question was settled that the first amendment
debate was such a desultory affair. If it were agreed (as it was agreed)
that the states would have virtually exclusive power over the entire
subject, it is less to be wondered that the scope of "the freedom" itself
went substantially unattended. No clash of libertarian and antilibertarian views took place, because the framers' sole concern was to
secure the subject from Congress.
There was no speech or press crisis in 1787 or 1789 or 1791, when
the first amendment was born. And as the "who" question appeared
to be so congenially resolved, it is not odd that the answer to the
"what" question was virtually subsumed in the answer to the "who"
question: the freedom of the press would be whatever decentralized
centers of power (the state governments) felt appropriate to allow, no
matter what Congress might think, for it was Congress and its power,
no one else's, that the amendment was designed to forestall. The
scope of the first amendment must therefore be worked out in light
of that understanding, rather than on the basis of some other view.
Professor Levy acknowledges the importance of the federalism
issue, but then takes a wrong turn in suggesting how it plays out.
After insisting that "we should recognize that the Framers cared less
about giving unqualified immunity to all speech than they cared for
states' rights" (p. 268),21 Levy proceeds at once to suggest that the
scope of speech the states generally valued under their own laws would
exhaust the scope of speech they would likewise wish to keep from
Congress. Thus, immediately following his statement on the federalism issue, he tends to dismiss that issue's significance in the following
remark: "The big question persists, however; even had Congress
21 It should be noted again, however, that the two did not need to be mutually exclusive;
the framers were able to provide both for full states' rights and for unqualified immunity from
Congress.
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passed, and the states ratified, an amendment imposing upon the
states the same prohibition laid by the First Amendment upon the
national government, what did the Framers understand by freedom
of speech and freedom of press?" (p. 268). But this inquiry serves
only to muddle the issue by failing to recognize the distinction the
framers drew between the powers of the states and the powers of
Congress.
The question is not (as Levy implies) what the framers would have
understood by "freedom of speech and press" had they imposed "the
same" restrictions on the states as they did impose on Congress. The
framers were neither interested nor willing to limit the states' police
powers by doing anything of the sort. Neither is the question how
the framers would have defined freedom of speech and freedom of
the press for the purpose of framing a separate amendment addressed
only to the states, and not at all to Congress. Rather, the question is
what they presumably meant to reserve for the states by denying to
Congress a preemptive power to regulate differently, and that, one
may suppose, would be virtually the entire field of speech, rather than
simply some small, uncontroversial part of it.
The consequence of this view, which Professor Levy's evidence
strongly supports, is that it does not require evidence of some prevailing eighteenth-century libertarianism for a fair-minded historian
to regard the first amendment as nonetheless a massive and deliberate
denial of power in Congress over speech and press. The question that
Leonard Levy states was "the big question" - namely, how much
speech and press actually to protect - was deliberately left to each
state largely to settle for itself without any preemptive authority in
Congress to impose its own will. The foremost concern of the first
amendment, indeed its sole concern, was to keep such determinations
from Congress.
In keeping with this understanding, it is conceivable that a few
marginal measures might nonetheless be seen as sufferable for Congress to impose - for example, laws punishing acts of perjury in
federal proceedings or laws forbidding false advertising in interstate
trade - but assuredly nothing significantly beyond measures of such
relatively trivial application or scope as these would represent. Anything more would seem entirely inconsistent with the basic thrust of
the amendment, exactly as Madison had maintained.
Accordingly, the federalism auspices of the first amendment provided their own foundation for the "checking function" 22 view of the
amendment, notwithstanding the outrage of the Sedition Act of 1798
22 Cf. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Amt. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521 (discussing the function of the first amendment in checking the abuse of official
power); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Anmendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191 (same).
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and its administration (principally by Federalist judges). Nor does
this view require any romanticized interpretation of the first amendment, but merely an interpretation by persons possessing an intelligent
skepticism of centralized government. Such persons we know were
abundant in 1787, 1789, and 1791, exactly as Levy's scholarship well
concedes. May we not, then, treat the first amendment as the consequential by-product of their successful campaign and read it appropriately as they proposed? I think a fair case can be made that we
may - as indeed, somewhat despite himself, Leonard Levy has
shown.
III.

FINAL IMPRESSIONS

The subject to which Professor Levy has devoted himself has been
one of enormous contention from 1798 (the date of the Sedition Act)
to the present, and Levy's painstaking review is among the best that
can be found. Overall, it is exceptionally clear-eyed, comprehensive,
and perceptive. Indeed, in my own view it is the single best critical
history of the first amendment that has been written. Until one has
grappled with what Levy has to say on this subject, one can scarcely
claim to know the subject at all. Emergence of a Free Press is
indispensable reading for the serious student of free speech in America.
Of course, one might assert that books of this sort do not much
matter except as a source of cultural interest - that the first amendment is what the judges say it is and that they are not bound (indeed,
they seem scarcely inclined) to pay history any mind. Even if this
assertion were wholly true, it would be no reason to forgo the experience of this book, which speaks so well to its subject and merits
one's interest entirely for its own sake. More important, however, it
is gross error to suppose that history does not matter. Indeed, it
matters greatly.
Even granting the flexibility of constitutional construction, it is
surely true that judges are human and will generally prefer to think
that what they say is not a falsification of the document they are
called upon to apply, but is at least in reasonably close keeping with
its spirit. On this basis alone, history is scarcely avoidable. Unless
one takes an interest in what the first amendment was meant to do,
at least in a general way, one cannot know whether the interpretation
one proposes to place upon the amendment comes reasonably close to
the spirit of the thing. And once one does turn even a little in that
direction - that is, in the direction of this amendment, in this Constitution - it is hard to lay aside one's inquiry until one feels one has
23
indeed caught at least the essence of the thing itself.

2-1For further discussion, see Van Alstvne, Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful
Contribution of Special Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209 (1983).
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On the basis of Emergence, I think the essence of the first amendment was a resolve to cut Congress off from claims it might otherwise
have made to regulate speech and press in America. The reason for
this resolve may have had more to do with states' rights concerns
than with libertarian concerns as such, but the end point was nonetheless the same. If this conclusion is true, then the logical consequence is that the amendment should probably be applied even more
tightly by the courts than it traditionally has been, rather than more
loosely as some judges are now inclined to do. The history Levy sets
out thus does suggest an appropriate modern-day interpretation of the
first amendment. His work thereby enriches our understanding not
only of what we have been, but also of what we may yet become.

